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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
RAY W. ROSEBRAUGH, as Administrator 
of the Estate of Wesley D. Brown, De-
ceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
REX G. BRANCH, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
I 
No. 7252 
STATEMENT Q·F THE CASE, THE ISSUES AND THE FACTS 
Th~ brief of plaintiff and appellant states the issues and 
facts of the case. The question, therefore, resolves itself into 
whether or not Mr. Brown and Mr. Branch inadvertently and by 
mistake used the figures $6,600.00 instead of $3,943.93. The Pre-
Trial Order stated that the only matter to be submitted was 
whether there was a mutual mistake as to the price to be paid 
for the brokerage business. 
ARGUMENT 
Let us consider what evidence was presented in the case. 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The note was presented as plaintiff's Exhibit A. The defendant 
then called George Harding Horsley. Undoubtedly no other 
person was in a position to testify as did Mr. Horsley. He and 
Mr. Brown occupied the same office, one handling food proces-
sing machinery and the other handling and operating a food 
brokerage. Is it not the natural process for Mr. Brown to in-
,form Mr. Horsley that Brown was selling his business to 
Branch? Mr. Horsley testified that Mr. Brown informed him 
that on account of Brown's failing health, that he was selling 
to Branch. We next quote Horsley's testimony on Page 8 of the 
transcript: "He said that they had gone back and were taking 
t~e earnings of the brokerage company during the past five-
year period and then dividing them by five to get them on a 
five-year average, and on that basis he was selling the business 
to Mr. Branch." We call the court's attention to the fact that 
Mr. Brown in this statement was telling what he and Branch 
had done and how the selling price had been arriv~d at. This 
testimony shows not only Mr. Brown's idea but also .the "idea of 
Mr. Branch and clearly shows that both of the men were labor-
ing under a mutual mistake. 
Now let us see what corroborative evidence was submitted 
to show this mutual mistake. We first submit the testimony of 
Joan Kruitmoes. She was the bookkeeper and general clerical . 
assistant in the Brown Brokerage Company. On Pa_ge 13 of the 
transcript of the evidence she testified that Mr. Brown told her 
to take the figures for 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945 and 1946 and get 
the yearly average for those five years. On Page 14 'she testified 
that she took the totals and made the average for the five years. 
She identified the various papers. She apparently was not told 
why Mr. Brown wanted the five-year average, but he did in-
struct her to make the compilation, which she did. The exhibits 
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showed the average for the five-year period was $3,943.93. 
We next consider the testimony of Herbert J. Corkey, a 
C. P. A., who was the senior accountant of the firm of Wells, 
Baxter & Miller. This firm had prepared the income tax returns 
for Mr. Brown from 1943 to 1946 inclusive, and Mr. Corkey had 
also rxamined the Brown books for 1942. On Page 29 he testi-
fied that the average of the brokerage business for the five-year 
period was $3,94~.93. 
In the brief of the appellant the attention of the court was 
called to the fact that the defendant did not testify regarding 
his transactions with the deceased person. Clearly 104-49-2, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, prohibits such testimony. The brief states, 
however, that any objection might have been waived by the 
plaintiff. The law expressly says that "The following persons 
cannot be witnesses:" and then enumerates the condition that 
existed in this case. The attorneys for the defendant followed 
the express law, and we feel that a statement that the defendant 
should have testified is ill-advised. It was not necessary for the 
defendant to testify that the mistake was mutual. Mr. Brown 
had done so in his statement to Mr. Horsley, and his books 
showed the same mistake. Brown said in his statement to Mr. 
Horsley that Brown and Branch had gone back and were taking 
the earnings of the brokerage company the past five-year period 
and then dividing them by five to get them on a five-year aver-
age, and on that basis Brown was selling the business to Branch. 
We maintain that that is a clear statement showing a mutual 
mistake. 
The plaintiff submitted no evidence whatsoever to rebut 
the testimony of the three witnesses for the defendant and the 
books and other papers showing the mistake. 
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The plaintiff and ap·pellant referred to the case of Weight 
v. Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 P. 899. This case shows that an in-
strument will not be reformed upon a probability or mere pre-
ponderance of evidence, but the only two wit~esses were the 
appellant and respondent. Their testimony was exactly opposite. 
The case is indeed entirely favorable to our idea of the present 
case, and tpat is that our evidence is clear and distinct. There is 
no evidence to the contrary, as existed in the Weight v. Bailey 
case. 
We refer to 45 Am. jur., Page 618, wherein a mutual mis-
take is described as one which is reciprocal and common to both 
parties, each alike laboring under the same misconception in 
respect to the terms of the written instrument. 
The reformation of a written instrument is a matter for 
equitable relief. 
"If his case is weak in its equities, reformation will be 
denied. If his equity is met by an equity of equal dignity, 
the parties will be left to exercise their strict legal rights. 
If his equity is not met by opposing equities, the court will 
have less hesitation in granting the relief asked." 45 Am. 
jur., 628. 
Again we quote Am. jur. to show that we come within the 
law. 
"In other words, it must be proved that it was the 
intention of both parties to make an instrument such as is 
sought to be established by the allegations of the party 
claiming the equity of reformation. Express proof as to 
the intention must be adduced,. and the precise terms of a 
contract, if any existed, must be proved." 45 Am. jur., 649. 
We established the evidence of the mistake in the testi-
mony. 
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"Evidence of fraud or mistake is seldom found in the 
instrument itself, and unless parol evidence may be ad-
mitted for the purpose of procuring its reformation, the 
aggrieved party would have as little hope of redress in a 
court of equity as in a court of law. Generally, it may be 
said that any testimony which tends to prove the mistake 
alleged or the intention of the parties is admissible. A wit· 
ness in a position to know may testify concerning the in-
tention of the parties to an agreement, to the same effect 
as to any other fact." 45 Am. jur. 650. 
The evidence was clear and fully satisfied the trial court. 
"Whatever the form 6f expression, the only question 
is, does it satisfy the mind of the co_urt? When the mind of 
a judge is entirely convinced upon any disputed question, 
whether of fact or law, he is bound to act on the conviction. 
Of course, relief will be granted if the mistake is admitted 
by the other party." 45 Am. jur. 653. 
We feel that the statement made by Mr. Brown to Mr. Horsley 
is practically the same as though he were admitting the mistake. 
The court was satisfied and we believe that the case is not one 
fo~ reversal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 
"In actions for reformation, the question whether the 
evidence is of the strong character required to justify relief 
is one of fact for the trier of the fact. Under the practice 
in some states, a decree reforming an instrument will not 
be reversed on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, 
if there is a preponderance of evidence in support of the 
findings, such preponderance being regarded as sufficient 
to sustain a judgment in any civil case; and as in other 
cases, a decision upon a conflict of evidence as to mistake 
is conclusive on the appellate court." 45 Am. jur. 656. 
The various cases cited in 3 Am. jur. on Appeal and Error, 
as shown on Page 480, clearly show that the holding of the trial 
court should be sustained. 
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"Even though in equity cases the reviewing court ex-
amines the evidence, it will not, as a general rule, disturb 
the findings of the chancellor or the trial judge on questions 
of fact and the decree or judgment based thereon, unless . 
the findings are clearly against the preponderance of the · 
evidence; against a clear preponderance of the evidence; 
are clearly or manifestly against the weight of the evidence; 
are clearly and plainly wrong; unless it clearly appears that 
the chancellor or the trial judge erred in his conclusion~; 
or unless the findings are clearly and manifestly wrong. In 
any event, the decision of the chancellor on a question of 
fact will be affirmed on app.eal if his finding is supported 
by a preponderance of the evidence; and where, under the 
evidence as a whole, the truth of the matter involved is 
doubtful, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the finding . 
of the. c~ancellor." 3 Am. jur. 480. 
CO·NC'LUSION: 
The only evidence submitted in this case and justice and 
equity and all general principles of law show that this contract 
should be reformed. There is no dispute but what there was a 
mistake, and that in lieu of the figure of $6,600.00 the amount 
should have been $3,943.93. Mr. Brown's books, records, income 
tax reports and his own statement to Horsley established this 
fact. In addition, the defendant and respondent is supported by 
the testimony of all witnesses, and certainly the action of the 
trial court shows that in his mind the evidence of the mutual 
mistake was clear and convincing. 
We, therefore, submit that the judgment of the lower court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOWE & LOWE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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